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PAUL R. PANTHER 
Deputy Attorney General 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,  
 




MIGUEL ANGEL HERNANDEZ, 
 












          NO. 43985 
 
          Bingham County Case No.  
          CR-2014-1459 
 
           
          RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
 
     
      Issue 
Has Hernandez failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion, 
either by relinquishing jurisdiction, or by denying his Rule 35 motion for reduction of his 
unified sentence of seven years, with three years fixed, imposed following his guilty plea 
to possession of methamphetamine? 
 
 
Hernandez Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing 
Discretion 
 
 On March 12, 2014, Hernandez went to Idaho Falls “‘to sell some meth and 
some pills to have gas money’” so he could drive to Salt Lake City, Utah “‘to pick up a 
half pound of crystal meth.’”  (PSI, pp.3-4.)  After Hernandez sold the methamphetamine 
 2 
and pills, he got on the freeway to drive to Salt Lake City; however, an officer stopped 
him for crossing over the fog line.  (PSI, p.4; R., p.39.)  The officer arrested Hernandez 
“for driving on a suspended license” and, upon searching the vehicle with a K9, officers 
found methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia including a pipe, spoons, multiple 
baggies, and a scale.  (R., pp.39-42.)  
The state charged Hernandez with possession of methamphetamine.  (R., pp.59-
60.)  Pursuant to a plea agreement, Hernandez pled guilty to possession of 
methamphetamine and the state agreed to dismiss the “related misdemeanors.”  (R., 
pp.83, 117.)  The district court imposed a unified sentence of seven years, with three 
years fixed, suspended Hernandez’s sentence, and placed him on supervised probation 
for five years with the condition that he successfully complete the Wood Pilot Project 
program.  (R., pp.117-24.)   
Approximately five months later, Hernandez’s probation officer filed a report of 
violation alleging that Hernandez had violated the conditions of his probation by being 
suspended from the Wood Pilot Project program for violating multiple program rules and 
being “non-responsive and argumentative in treatment.”  (R., pp.131-32.)  Hernandez 
admitted the allegation and the district court revoked his probation, ordered the 
underlying sentence executed, and retained jurisdiction.  (R., pp.144-46.)  Following the 
period of retained jurisdiction, the district court relinquished jurisdiction.  (R., pp.154-59.)  
Hernandez filed a notice of appeal timely from the district court’s order relinquishing 
jurisdiction.  (R., pp.163-65.)  He also filed a timely Rule 35 motion for a reduction of 
sentence, which the district court denied.  (R., pp.160-62, 179-84.)     
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Hernandez asserts that the district court abused its discretion by relinquishing 
jurisdiction in light of his performance on his rider and his claim that NICI’s 
recommendation for relinquishment was “misguided.”  (Appellant’s brief, pp.3-5.)  
Hernandez has failed to establish an abuse of discretion.   
“Probation is a matter left to the sound discretion of the court.”  I.C. § 19-2601(4). 
 The decision to relinquish jurisdiction is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial 
court and will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion.  See 
State v. Hood, 102 Idaho 711, 712, 639 P.2d 9, 10 (1981); State v. Lee, 117 Idaho 203, 
205-06, 786 P.2d 594, 596-97 (Ct. App. 1990).  A court’s decision to relinquish 
jurisdiction will not be deemed an abuse of discretion if the trial court has sufficient 
information to determine that a suspended sentence and probation would be 
inappropriate under I.C. § 19-2521.  State v. Chapel, 107 Idaho 193, 194, 687 P.2d 583, 
584 (Ct. App. 1984).  An offender’s “[g]ood performance while on retained jurisdiction, 
though commendable, does not alone establish an abuse of discretion in the district 
judge's decision not to grant probation.”  State v. Hurst, 151 Idaho 430, 438, 258 P.3d 
950, 958 (Ct. App. 2011) (citing State v. Statton, 136 Idaho 135, 137, 30 P.3d 290, 292 
(2001)). 
In its order relinquishing jurisdiction, the district court articulated the correct legal 
standards applicable to its decision and also set forth its reasons for following NICI’s 
recommendation for relinquishment.  (R., pp.154-58.)  The state submits that 
Hernandez has failed to establish an abuse of discretion, for reasons more fully set forth 
in the district court’s Order Relinquishing Jurisdiction, which the state adopts as its 
argument on appeal.  (Appendix A.)   
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Hernandez next asserts that the district court abused its discretion by denying his 
Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence in light of his belief that his sentence was 
“‘pretty stiff’” and because, he claimed, he “accepted accountability for the offense at the 
request of his girlfriend,” he was “‘healthy and sober,’” and he “could work out any 
issues with authority through ‘pro-social communication’ while on probation.”  
(Appellant’s brief, p.5 (citing PSI, p.8 and R., pp.161-62).)  In State v. Huffman, 144 
Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007), the Idaho Supreme Court observed that a 
Rule 35 motion “does not function as an appeal of a sentence.”  The Court noted that 
where a sentence is within statutory limits, a Rule 35 motion is merely a request for 
leniency, which is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  Id.  Thus, “[w]hen presenting a 
Rule 35 motion, the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light of new 
or additional information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the 
Rule 35 motion.”  Id.  Absent the presentation of new evidence, “[a]n appeal from the 
denial of a Rule 35 motion cannot be used as a vehicle to review the underlying 
sentence.”  Id.  Accord State v. Adair, 145 Idaho 514, 516, 181 P.3d 440, 442 (2008).   
Hernandez provided no new information in support of his Rule 35 motion.  He 
merely claimed that he lied to the court and to the presentence investigator when he 
accepted responsibility for the instant offense, and that he “wasn’t the one in possession 
of any of the drugs found” and his girlfriend “talk[ed him] into” lying.  (R., p.161.)  He 
also claimed that he “exaggerated” the extent of his drug use during his presentence 
interview “so it would g[u]arantee a sentence involving a specialty court or a chance at 
probation,” and that his “issues with authority” while on his rider “stemmed from the fact 
that [he] felt” drug treatment was “not what [he] really needed.”  (R., p.161.)  
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Hernandez’s claims that he exaggerated and lied to the presentence investigator and to 
the court do not merit a reduction of sentence, nor are these claims “new” information, 
as Hernandez was aware of his deception at the time of the jurisdictional review hearing 
and chose not to disclose it.  Rule 35 functions to allow a defendant to request leniency 
in light of “new or additional” information that was not available at the time of 
sentencing, not to allow a defendant to purposefully withhold information that was 
clearly available at the time of sentencing so that he can later present it as “new” for the 
purpose of a Rule 35 motion.  It would be improper to set a standard that permits 
defendants to purposefully provide false information to the district court at sentencing 
and subsequently claim that correcting the falsehood is “new” information in support of a 
Rule 35 motion.  Because Hernandez presented no new evidence in support of his Rule 
35 motion, he failed to demonstrate in the motion that his sentence was excessive.  
Having failed to make such a showing, he has failed to establish any basis for reversal 




 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s orders 
relinquishing jurisdiction and denying Hernandez’s Rule 35 motion for a reduction of 
sentence. 
       




      __/s/_Lori A. Fleming__________ 
      LORI A. FLEMING 
      Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
      VICTORIA RUTLEDGE 
      Paralegal 
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  DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
 




      __/s/_Lori A. Fleming__________ 
     LORI A. FLEMING 
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IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF RINGHAM 
STATE OF IDAHO. 
PlaintifC 
vs. 
Ml(ilJEI . AN(iEI. HERNANDEZ, 
Defendant. 
Cose No. CR-20M -1'159 
ORDER RELINQUISHING 
,JURISDICTION 
THIS COURT, on Feh11.1ary JO, 2015, sentenced Defendant Miguel Angel Hernandez 
(hereinafter "Hernandez") to the l<lahu Slate Hoard uf Com:dio11 for n u11ilied term of seven years, 
of which three years are fixed and determinate and four years nre indctcnninntc. 1 This Court 
retained jurisdiction over Hernandez for a period of three· hundred and sixty-five days.2 
On November 5, 2015, this Court received a report from the Nor1h Idaho Correctional 
Institution (hereinafter the "NCIC") which recommended relinquishmetll of jurisdiction over 
Hernandez. Hernandez requested a hearing.J 
1 Order of Retain~d Jurisdiction Order Revoking Probation, Stale 1•. HernandcJz, Bingham County ca~c no.CR-2014· 
1459 (tiled Fcbrunry 13, 2015). ut p. I. 
1 kl.. alp. 2. 
' Request for R~sp-011se tu Att;1~hed Do,;ument(s), S1c1111 , •• f/c,rn11111/e~. Bingham County ,a~t.'. 110. r.R-:?.014-14.~9 
(filed November 16, 2013). 
OIU>ER RELINQUISHING JURISOJCTION 
' I 
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Tdahv Code § 19-2521 sets fo11h lhe criteria this Court must consider when deciding 
whether to grant probation or impose imprisonment. Those criteria include the following: 
( I) The court shall deal with a person who hos been convicted of a 
crime without imposing sentence of imprisonment unless, having regard to the 
m1turc uml circumstances of the crime and the history. character and condition of 
the defendant, it is of the opinion that imprisonmem is appropriate for protection 
of the public because: 
(a) There is undue risk that during the period of a suspended 
sentence or probation the defendant will commit anolhcr crime; or 
(b} The dcfcndttnt is in need of correctional trcotmcnt thnt can 
be provided most effectively by his commitment 10 an institution; or 
(c) A lesser sentence will depreciate the seriousness of the 
defendant's crime; or 
(d) Imprisonment will provide appropriate punishment and 
deterrent lo lite defendant; or 
(c) lmprisonment will provide an approprialt! deterrent for 
(1thcr persons in the community; or 
(t) The defondant is a multiple offender or professional 
criminal. 
(2) The following grounds. while not controlling the discretion of the 
court. shnl I be accorded weight in favor of nvoiding a (lCntcnco of imprisonment: 
(a) The defendant's criminal conduct neither caused nor 
threatened harm; 
(b) The defendant did not contemplate that his criminal 
conduct would cause or threaten harm; 
(c) The dcfcndnnl acted under n strong provocation: 
(d) There were substontinl grounds tending to excuse or justify 
the defendant's criminal conduct, though failing to establish a defense; 
(c} The victim of the defom.laut'li crimimil conduct in<lucc<l or 
facilitated the commission of the crime; 
(t) The defendant has compensated or wi ll compensate the 
victim of his criminal conduct for the damage or injury that was sustained; 
provided. however, nothing in this section shall prevent the appropriate 
use of imprisonment ond restitution in r.omhination; 
(g) The defendant has no history of prior dclim1uency or 
criminal uctivity or has led a law-ahiding life for a substantial period of 
tin 11: bt.:forc:: th<:: commission of the present crime; 
(h) The d~fcndanl 's criminal conduct was the rel>ull of 
circumstances unlikely to recur; 
(i) The character and attitude of the defendant indicate that the 
commission of another crime is unlikely. 
ORDER RELINQUISHING JURISDl<..TION 2 
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A decision to relinquish jurisdiction is a matter of discretion.4 Accordingly, this Court 
must: (I) rightly perceive the question as one of discretion, (2) act within the outer houndaries of'its 
discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable, and (3) reach its decision by an 
exercise of reason.) 
Drug mld Alcohol Rehabilitation Specialist Holly Graham-Allman recommended that this 
Court relinquish jurisdiction over Hernandez approximately seven months into his one-year-long 
retained jurisdiction program at NCIC. During this seven-month period, I Icrnandcz had three 
infom1al disciplinary offense reports (April J 9, 2015: receiving indigent supplies when he was not 
indigent; April 21, 2015: sharing commissary - unauthorized tnmslcr or property; and June 18, 
2015: horseplay). In addition, Hernandez received two fonnal disciplinary s,mctions (October 6, 
2015: horseplay; and October 24, 2015: hanLssmenl, Class B). 
Ms. Graham-Allman further rcporte<l that when Hcrnan<le;. pre:senti:d at NICI, he had a very 
negative attitude toward most things, including staff, the rules, ond the programming he was being 
asked to complete. Hernimdez' attitude was a significant factor in his removal from the "Rider" 
program. Hernandez did demonstrate progress in other ways. He was significantly more open to 
the feedback and insight of his peers than he was to that of authority figures. He wus able to make 
significant progress in addressing his criminal and addictive thinking and numerous behaviors. I Ie 
demonstrated improvement in his willingness to follow the rules. He encouraged others to do the 
same. He wns very diligent in completing his assigned work duties and took great pride in helping 
4 Slate v. C/111pmr111, 120 Idaho 466,472, 816 P.2d 1023, 1029 (Ct. App. 1991). 
5 
State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 77'2, 782,948 l'.2d 127, 137 (1997). 
ORDF.R RELINQUISIITNG .IIJIUSnlCTION 3 
156 
APPENDIX A – Page 4 
 
• • 
his peers become successful ns well. He was seen by his peers as lcvcl-hca<led and honest. He 
demonstrated care and concern for his peers. He completed all of his assigned program work, and 
the quality of his work improved over tirm.:. He was also willi11g tu hold his peers accountable ru1d 
engaged actively in the various TC processes. He held several dinerenl coordinator positions and 
excelled in all of them. JTc eventually became willing to comply with the many nilcs of the TC 
program and even reached a point of endorsing the mies and TC values, goals, and concepts. While 
in the TC program, he cvcnmnlly eomcd standing as a role-model participant ond was placed in the 
position of orientation crew coordinator where he was responsible for teaching the rules, values, 
goals, and concepts to new arrivals. 
Hernandez become an active participant in the Cognitive Self-Change Group, but could not 
complete the program hecause he left the TC program. He was also an active particip,mt in the 
Relapse Prevenrion Group, but bcgiln to revert to a ncgntivc nttitude and mindset in the two week 
prior to his removnl. Hernnndez decided he did not want to complete his FATHERS program, 
despite hnving only one week left. I le also complclcd mos! of the requirements for the pre-release 
program. 
Despite his progress, Hernandez continued lo struggle to marrnge his relationships with 
authorit)' figures. This altitude and his underlying belief<; contributed to his removal from the 
progrnm. Hernandez nlso dcmonstrntcd that he wos a potential security threat during his 
involvement in n group disturbance. When asked why he should be granted the privilege of 
probntion, he replied "I have been here 8 months and I have done all of my work. In all the 
craziness after they took away the TC l lmvc liaf on my bunk and tried 10 stay out of nil the mess, 
kept to myself. and tried to stay out of trouble. f am not the same person I was when I got here." 
ORDER RELINQUISHING .JURISOICTION 4 
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This Court applauds Hcmru1dcz for the progress he bcgim to make at NCIC. Additional 
progranuning is m:eded, howevt:r, to help Hernam.lez get away from addictive thinking patterns, 
attitudes and beliefs. In addition, successful completion or probation involves work ,,~th authority 
figures. Until Hcmandez hecomes willing to ltccept ndvice ltnd instniciion from authority figures, 
he will not be a good candidate for probntion. For these reasons, this Court rdinquishes jurisdiction 
over Hernandez. Accordingly, 
IT JS ORDERED that l lemandcz is rnmmi!lcd fully to !he Idaho State Department of 
Correction under the sentence previously affixed herein. 
DATED this -z:z!'{iay of Jununry ?..O 16. 
(J 
"4Jht1Mt 
)un ·n f3. Si~p.~-·· --- --· 
District Judgci 
ORDER RELINQUISIIING .JUR ISDICTION 5 
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